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Abstract
This paper deals with secure state estimation of cyber-physical systems subject to switching (on/off) attack
signals and injection of fake packets (via either packet substitution or insertion of extra packets). The random set
paradigm is adopted in order to model, via Random Finite Sets (RFSs), the switching nature of both system attacks
and the injection of fake measurements. The problem of detecting an attack on the system and jointly estimating its
state, possibly in the presence of fake measurements, is then formulated and solved in the Bayesian framework for
systems with and without direct feedthrough of the attack input to the output. This leads to the analytical derivation
of a hybrid Bernoulli filter (HBF) that updates in real-time the joint posterior density of a Bernoulli attack RFS and
of the state vector. A closed-form Gaussian-mixture implementation of the proposed hybrid Bernoulli filter is fully
derived in the case of invertible direct feedthrough. Finally, the effectiveness of the developed tools for joint attack
detection and secure state estimation is tested on two case-studies concerning a benchmark system for unknown
input estimation and a standard IEEE power network application.
Index Terms
Cyber-physical systems; secure state estimation; Bayesian state estimation; Bernoulli filter; extra packet
injection; random finite sets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are complex engineered systems arising from the integration of computational
resources and physical processes, tightly connected through a communication infrastructure. Typical examples of
CPSs include next-generation systems in building and environmental monitoring/control, health care, electric power
grids, transportation and mobility and industrial process control. While, on one hand, advances in CPS technology
will enable enhanced autonomy, efficiency, seamless interoperability and cooperation, on the other hand the increased
interaction between cyber and physical realms is unavoidably providing novel security vulnerabilities, which make
CPSs subject to non-standard malicious threats. Recent real-world attacks such as the Maroochy Shire sewage spill,
the Stuxnet worm sabotaging an industrial control system, and the lately reported massive power outage against
Ukrainian electric grid [1], have brought into particularly sharp focus the urgency of designing secure CPSs. It
is worth pointing out that in presence of malicious threats against CPSs, standard approaches extensively used for
control systems subject to benign faults and failures are no longer suitable. Moreover, the design and implementation
of defense mechanisms usually employed for cyber security, can only guarantee limited layers of protection, since
they do not take into account vulnerabilities like the ones on physical components. This is why recent research
efforts on the design of secure systems have explored different routes. Preliminary work addressed the issues of
attack detection/identification, and proposed attack monitors for deterministic control systems [2]. Secure strategies
have been studied for replay attacks [3], [4] where the adversary first records and then replays the observed data, as
well as for denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [5], [6] disrupting the flow of data. Moreover, active detection methods
have been designed in order to detect stealthy attacks via manipulation of, e.g., control inputs [7] or dynamics [8].
Over the last few years, the problem of secure state estimation, i.e. capable of reconstructing the state even when
the CPS of interest is under attack, has gained considerable attention [9]–[18]. Initial work considered a worst-case
approach for the special class of SISO systems [9]. Under the assumption of linear systems subject to an unknown
but bounded number of false-data injection attacks on sensor outputs, the problem for a noise-free system has been
cast into an `0−optimization problem, which can be relaxed as a more efficient convex problem [10], and, in turn,
adapted to systems with bounded noise [11]. Further advances tried to tackle the combinatorial complexity of the
problem by resorting to satisfiability modulo theories [12] and investigated, in the same context, the case of Gaussian
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2measurement noise [13] and the concept of observability under attacks [14]. Most recently, deterministic models of
the most popular attack policies have been presented based on adversary’s resources and system knowledge [15],
and secure state estimation of CPSs has been addressed [16] by modeling in a stochastic framework the attacker’s
decision-making by assuming Markov (possibly uninformative) decision processes instead of unknown or worst-case
models.
Though the literature on attack-resilient state estimation is quite abundant, most of the existing contributions
have adopted a deterministic (worst-case) approach and/or have been restricted to linear systems. In practice, the
system monitor (defender) might have some (even no) probabilistic prior knowledge on the attacker’s strategy
and the CPS of interest might easily be affected by nonlinearities. In this respect, a Bayesian approach where prior
knowledge on the attacks is characterized in terms of probability distributions and nonlinearities are possibly handled
by particle filtering or Gaussian-mixture methods, seems well suited and will be pursued in this paper. This allows
great flexibility in that knowledge available to the attack monitor can range from complete knowledge to no prior
knowledge (uninformative prior) depending on the assumed distributions.
Specifically, in this paper three different types of adversarial attacks on CPSs are considered: (i) signal attack,
i.e. signal of arbitrary magnitude and location injected (with known structure) to corrupt sensor/actuator data, (ii)
packet substitution attack, describing an intruder that possibly intercepts and then replaces the system-generated
measurement with a fake (unstructured) one, and (iii) extra packet injection, a new type of attack against state
estimation, already introduced in information security [19], [20], in which multiple counterfeit observations (junk
packets) are possibly added to the system-generated measurement. Note that the key feature distinguishing signal
attacks on sensors from packet substitution, relies on the fact that the former are assumed to alter the measurement
through a given structure (i.e., known measurement function), whereas the latter mechanism captures integrity attacks
that spoof sensor data packets with no care of the model structure. By considering both structured and unstructured
injections, we do not restrict the type of attack the adversary can enforce on the sensor measurements. Please notice
that, as a further by-product, the Bayesian approach with uninformative prior can also deal with the situation in
which the attacker has the ability to choose arbitrarily large attack and/or fake measurements, while the worst-case
attack paradigm in this case is not viable.
The present paper aims to address the problem of simultaneously detecting a signal attack while estimating the
state of the monitored system, possibly in presence of fake measurements independently injected into the system’s
monitor by cyber-attackers. A random set attack modeling approach is undertaken by representing the signal attack
presence/absence by means of a Bernoulli random set (i.e. a set that, with some probability, can be either empty or
a singleton depending on the presence or not of the attack) and by taking into account possible fake measurements
by means of a random measurement set. We follow the approach of Forti et al. [17], [18] and formulate the joint
attack detection-state estimation problem within the Bayesian framework as the recursive determination of the joint
posterior density of the signal attack Bernoulli set and of the state vector at each time given all the measurement
sets available up to that time. Strictly speaking, the posed Bayesian estimation problem is neither standard [21]
nor Bernoulli filtering [22]–[25] but is rather a hybrid Bayesian filtering problem that aims to jointly estimate a
Bernoulli random set for the signal attack and a random vector for the system state. An analytical solution of the
hybrid filtering problem has been found in terms of integral equations that generalize the Bayes and Chapman-
Kolmogorov equations of the Bernoulli filter. In particular, the proposed hybrid Bernoulli Bayesian filter for joint
attack detection-state estimation propagates in time, via a two-step prediction-correction procedure, a joint posterior
density completely characterized by a triplet consisting of: (1) a signal attack probability; (2) a probability density
function (PDF) in the state space for the system under no signal attack; (3) a PDF in the joint attack input-state
space for the system under signal attack.
The adopted approach enjoys the following positive features: 1) it encompasses in a unique framework different
types of attacks (signal attacks, packet substitution, extra packet injection, temporary DoS, etc.); 2) it takes into
account the presence of disturbances and noise and deals with general nonlinear systems; 3) it propagates probability
distributions of the system state, attack signal and attack existence, which can be useful for, respectively, real-time
dynamic state estimation, attack reconstruction and security decision-making. Notice that, unlike most previous
work cited above, in the present paper we address the problem from the estimator’s perspective and, hence, we
cannot assume any specific strategy for the attacker. This motivates the modeling of the signal attack as a switching
unknown input affecting the system.
Preliminary work on Bayesian state estimation against switching unknown inputs and extra packet injection was
carried out by Forti et al. [17], [18]. The present paper extends this preliminary work in the following directions.
1) It also considers the packet substitution attack (in addition to the already considered extra packet injection attack).
This novel type of attack refers to the practically relevant situation wherein the attacker has the ability to intercept
and manipulate packets sent to the system monitor so as to replace system-originated measurements by fake ones
but, unlike the extra packet injection attack, cannot send additional indistinguishable packets containing fake
3measurements to confuse the system monitor.
2) It provides the full derivation of a closed-form solution of the posed Bayesian filtering problem for linear-
Gaussian models based on a Gaussian-mixture approach. This allows a computationally efficient implementation
of the proposed joint attack detector-state estimator also extendable to nonlinear models via extended or unscented
(instead of standard) Kalman filtering techniques.
3) It considers also the case of no direct feedthrough of the attack input into the observed output.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the considered attack models and provides
the necessary background on joint input-and-state estimation as well as on random set estimation. Sections III and
IV formulate and solve the joint attack detection-state estimation problem of interest in the Bayesian framework.
Section V provides detailed derivations of the Gaussian-mixture hybrid Bernoulli filer for linear-Gaussian mod-
els. Then, Section VI demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed approach via numerical examples. Finally,
Section VII ends the paper with concluding remarks and perspectives for future work.
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND PRELIMINARIES
A. System description and attack model
Let the discrete-time cyber-physical system of interest be modeled by
xk+1 =
{
f0k (xk) + wk, under no attack
f1k (xk, ak) + wk, under attack
(1)
where: k is the time index; xk ∈ Rn is the state vector to be estimated; ak ∈ Rm, called attack vector, is an
unknown input affecting the system only when it is under attack; f0k (·) and f1k (·, ·) are known state transition
functions that describe the system evolution in the no attack and, respectively, attack cases; wk is a random process
disturbance also affecting the system. For monitoring purposes, the state of the above system is observed through
the measurement model
yk =
{
h0k(xk) + vk, under no attack
h1k(xk, ak) + vk, under attack
(2)
where: h0k(·) and h1k(·, ·) are known measurement functions that refer to the no attack and, respectively, attack cases;
vk is a random measurement noise. It is assumed that the measurement yk is actually delivered to the system monitor
with probability pd ∈ (0, 1], where the non-unit probability might be due to a number of reasons (e.g. temporary
denial of service, packet loss, sensor inability to detect or sense the system, etc.). The attack modeled in (1)-(2)
via the attack vector ak is usually referred to as signal attack. While for ease of presentation only the case of a
single attack model is taken into account, multiple attack models [26] could be accommodated in the considered
framework by letting (1)-(2) depend on a discrete variable, say νk, which specifies the particular attack model and
has to be estimated together with ak. Besides the system-originated measurement yk in (2), it is assumed that the
system monitor might receive fake measurements from some cyber-attacker. In this respect, the following two cases
will be considered.
1) Packet substitution - With some probability pf ∈ [0, 1), the attacker replaces the system-originated measurement
yk with a fake one y
f
k .
2) Extra packet injection - The attacker sends to the monitor one or multiple fake measurements indistinguishable
from the system-originated one.
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Fig. 1: Packet substitution attack.
For the subsequent developments, it is convenient to introduce the attack set at time k, Ak, which is either equal
to the empty set if the system is not under signal attack at time k or to the singleton {ak} otherwise, i.e.
Ak =
{ ∅, if the system is not under signal attack
{ak}, otherwise.
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Fig. 2: Extra packet injection attack.
It is also convenient to define the measurement set at time k, Zk. For the packet substitution attack (Fig. 1):
Zk =

∅, with probability 1− pd
{yk}, with probability pd(1− pf )
{yfk}, with probability pd pf
(3)
where yk is given by (2) and y
f
k is a fake measurement provided by the attacker in place of yk. Conversely, for the
extra packet injection attack (Fig. 2) the definition (3) is replaced by
Zk = Yk ∪ Fk (4)
where
Yk =
{ ∅, with probability 1− pd
{yk}, with probability pd (5)
is the set of system-originated measurements and Fk the finite set of fake measurements.
The aim of this paper is to address the problem of joint attack detection and state estimation, which amounts to
jointly estimating, at each time k, the state xk and signal attack set Ak given the set of measurements Zk 4= ∪ki=1Zi
up to time k.
B. Joint input and state estimation
In this section, the main ideas of the Bayesian approach to Joint Input and State Estimation (JISE) [27] are
summarized. Consider a system affected by an unknown input ak{
xk+1 = f(xk, ak) + wk
yk = h(xk, ak) + vk
(6)
In JISE [27]–[29] it is customary to distinguish the case in which there is a direct feedthrough of the unknown
input ak to the output yk from the case of no direct feedthrough.
Direct feedthrough: Suppose that there is an invertible direct feedthrough [27], [28] of the unknown input ak to
the output yk, which amounts to assuming that the function h(x, a) is injective with respect to a for any x. In this
case, the Bayesian approach is based on the recursive computation of the joint PDF p(ak, xk|yk) of the unknown
input ak and state xk conditioned on all the information available up to the current time. Given the conditional
PDF, optimal estimates of ak and xk can be computed according to any given criterion, the most typical ones being
Maximum A-posteriori Probability (MAP) and Minimum Mean Square Error (MMSE). The joint conditional PDF
can be computed by means of a two-step procedure of correction and prediction. Suppose that at time k − 1, the
predicted posterior p(ak, xk|yk−1) has been computed. Then, at time k, when the new measurement yk is collected,
in the correction step the new conditional PDF p(ak, xk|yk) can be obtained by means of the Bayes rule
p(ak, xk|yk) = p(yk|ak, xk) p(ak, xk|y
k−1)
p(yk|yk−1) (7)
Conversely, the prediction step concerns the propagation of the conditional PDF from time k to time k + 1. In the
literature on unknown input estimation, it is usually supposed that the values ak and xk of unknown input and,
respectively, state at time k do not provide any information on the value ak+1 taken by the unknown input at time
k + 1. Accordingly, p(ak+1, xk+1|yk) takes the form
p(ak+1, xk+1|yk) = p(xk+1|yk) p(ak+1) (8)
5where the conditional PDF p(xk+1|yk) is computed via the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation
p(xk+1|yk) =
∫∫
p(xk+1|ak, xk) p(ak, xk|yk) dakdxk. (9)
With this respect, when no information on the unknown input ak+1 is supposed to be available, it is customary [27]
to resort to the so-called principle of indifference and take p(ak+1) as an uninformative (flat) prior. It is easy to
check that, in this case, the conditional PDF p(ak, xk|yk) resulting from the correction step can be rewritten as
p(ak, xk|yk) = p(yk|ak, xk) p(xk|y
k−1)∫ ∫
p(yk|a, x) p(x|yk−1) dx da (10)
Then, maximization of (10) with respect to xk and ak provides a MAP estimate of xk and a Maximum Likelihood
(ML) estimate of the unknown input ak. This is the approach followed by Fang et al. [27] that allows to generalize
the traditional techniques for linear systems [28], [29] to general nonlinear systems (see Theorems 1 and 2 in the
work of Fang et al. [27]).
No direct feedthrough: Suppose that there is no direct feedthrough [27], [29] of the unknown input ak to
the output yk so that yk = h(xk) + vk. In this case, the unknown input must be estimated with one step delay,
since yk+1 is the first measurement containing information on ak. Hence, the Bayesian approach is based on the
recursive computation of the joint PDF p(ak−1, xk|yk) of the unknown input ak−1 and state xk conditioned on all
the information available up to time k. Suppose that at time k−1, the predicted posterior p(ak−1, xk|yk−1) has been
computed. Then, at time k, when the new measurement yk is collected, in the correction step the new conditional
PDF p(ak−1, xk|yk) can be obtained by means of the Bayes rule
p(ak−1, xk|yk) = p(yk|xk) p(ak−1, xk|y
k−1)
p(yk|yk−1) (11)
while in the prediction step, p(ak, xk+1|yk) takes the form
p(ak, xk+1|yk) = p(xk+1|ak, yk) p(ak) (12)
where the conditional PDF p(xk+1|ak, yk) is computed via the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation
p(xk+1|ak, yk) =
∫
p(xk+1|ak, xk) p(xk|yk) dxk. (13)
When no information on the unknown input ak is supposed to be available so that p(ak) as an uninformative (flat)
prior, the conditional PDF p(ak−1, xk|yk) resulting from the correction step can be rewritten as
p(ak−1, xk|yk) = p(yk|xk) p(xk|ak−1, y
k−1)∫ ∫
p(yk|x) p(x|a, yk−1) dx da (14)
C. Random set estimation
An RFS (Random Finite Set) X over X is a random variable taking values in F(X), the collection of all finite
subsets of X. The mathematical background needed for Bayesian random set estimation can be found in Mahler’s
book [23]; here, the basic concepts needed for the subsequent developments are briefly reviewed. From a probabilistic
viewpoint, an RFS X is completely characterized by its set density f(X ), also called FISST (FInite Set STatistics)
probability density. In fact, given f(X ), the cardinality probability mass function ρ(n) that X have n ≥ 0 elements
and the joint PDFs f (x1, x2, . . . , xn|n) over Xn given that X have n elements, are obtained as follows:
ρ(n) =
1
n!
∫
Xn
f({x1, . . . , xn}) dx1 · · · dxn
f (x1, x2, . . . , xn|n) = 1
n! ρ(n)
f({x1, . . . , xn}).
In order to measure probability over subsets of X or compute expectations of random set variables, Mahler [23]
introduced the notion of set integral for a generic real-valued function g(X ) of an RFS X as∫
g(X ) δX = g(∅) +
∞∑
n=1
1
n!
∫
g({x1, . . . , xn}) dx1 · · · dxn (15)
6In particular, in this work we will consider the Bernoulli RFS, i.e. a random set which can be either empty or,
with some probability r ∈ [0, 1], a singleton {x} whose element is distributed over X according to the PDF p(x).
Accordingly, its set density is defined as follows:
f(X ) =
{
1− r, if X = ∅
r · p(x), if X = {x} (16)
Please notice that the above equation as well as all subsequent definitions of probability distributions involving a
Bernoulli set argument have two branches on the right-hand-side depending on whether the Bernoulli argument is
empty or a singleton.
III. BAYESIAN RANDOM SET FILTER FOR JOINT ATTACK DETECTION AND STATE ESTIMATION –
THE DIRECT FEEDTHROUGH CASE
Let us suppose that, when the attack input is present, there is a direct feedthrough from the attack ak to the
output yk. More specifically, in accordance with the considerations of Section II-B, it is assumed that, when the
attack input is present, the mapping from ak to yk is full rank, i.e. invertible. Let the attack input at time k be
modeled as a Bernoulli random set Ak ∈ B(A), where B(A) = ∅ ∪ S(A) is a set of all finite subsets of the attack
space A ⊆ Rm, and S(A) denotes the set of all singletons (i.e., sets with cardinality 1) {a} such that a ∈ A.
Further, let X ⊆ Rn denote the Euclidean space for the system state vector, then we can define the Hybrid Bernoulli
Random Set (HBRS) (A, x) as a new state variable which incorporates the Bernoulli attack random set A and the
random state vector x, taking values in the hybrid space B(A)×X. A HBRS is fully specified by the (signal attack)
probability r of A being a singleton, the PDF p0(x) defined on the state space X, and the joint PDF p1(a, x) defined
on the joint attack input-state space A× X, i.e.
p(A, x) =
{
(1− r) p0(x), if A = ∅
r · p1(a, x), if A = {a}
. (17)
Moreover, since integration over B(A)× X takes the form∫
B(A)×X
p(A, x)δA dx =
∫
p(∅, x) dx+
∫∫
p({a}, x) da dx (18)
where the set integration with respect to A is defined according to (15) while the integration with respect to x is an
ordinary one, it is easy to see that p(A, x) integrates to one by substituting (17) in (18), and noting that p0(x) and
p1(a, x) are conventional probability density functions on X and A×X, respectively. This, in turn, guarantees that
(17) is a FISST probability density for the HBRS (A, x). The notion of attack existence, embodied by parameter
r in (17), is introduced so as to detect the presence (existence) of a signal attack and hence initiate its estimation.
Thanks to this concept, as shown later on, the probability of attack existence is directly computed by the filter.
In this paper the attack input is modeled as a Bernoulli random set (BRS) to account for the fact that the attack
can switch (from off to on or viceversa) at any time with no prior knowledge on the attack onset/termination from
the system monitor side. The switching nature of the attack could be tackled in different ways, e.g. with multiple
models (one for the attack and another for the no-attack cases), but the random set approach undertaken in this
work turns out to be advantageous also to include other type of attacks, specifically packet substitution and extra
packet injection to be considered in the next subsection.
A. Measurement models and correction
1) Packet substitution: Let us consider the packet substitution attack model introduced in Section 2.1 and
denote by λ(Zk|Ak, xk) the likelihood function of the measurement set defined in (3), which has obviously two
possible forms, Ak being a Bernoulli random set. In particular, for Ak = ∅:
λ(Zk|∅, xk) =
{
1− pd, if Zk = ∅
pd
[
(1− pf ) `(yk|xk) + pf κ(yk)
]
, if Zk = {yk}
(19)
where {yk} denotes the singleton whose element represents a delivered measurement, i.e. λ({yk}|Ak, xk) is the
likelihood that a single measurement yk will be collected. Furthermore, `(yk|xk) is the standard likelihood function
of the system-generated measurement yk when no signal attack is present, whereas κ(·) is a PDF modeling the fake
measurement yfk , assumed to be independent of the system state. Conversely, for Ak = {ak}:
λ(Zk|{ak}, xk) =
{
1− pd, if Zk = ∅
pd
[
(1− pf ) `(yk|ak, xk) + pf κ(yk)
]
, if Zk = {yk}
(20)
7where `(yk|ak, xk) denotes the conventional likelihood of measurement yk, due to the system under attack ak in
state xk. Notice that, by using the definition of set integral (15), it is easy to check that both forms (19) and
(20) of the likelihood function λ(Zk|Ak, xk) integrate to one. Using the aforementioned measurement model, it is
possible to derive the exact correction equations of the Bayesian random set filter for joint attack detection and state
estimation, in case of substitution attack.
Theorem 1: (Correction under packet substitution attack) Suppose that the prior density at time k is hybrid
Bernoulli of the form
p(Ak, xk|Zk−1) =
{
(1− rk|k−1) p0k|k−1(xk), if Ak = ∅
rk|k−1 · p1k|k−1(ak, xk), if Ak = {ak}
. (21)
Then, given the measurement random set Zk defined in (3), also the posterior density at time k turns out to be
hybrid Bernoulli of the form
p(Ak, xk|Zk) =
{
(1− rk|k) p0k|k(xk), if Ak = ∅
rk|k · p1k|k(ak, xk), if Ak = {ak}
(22)
completely specified by the triplet(
rk|k, p0k|k(xk), p
1
k|k(ak, xk)
)
=
(
rk|k−1, p0k|k−1(xk), p
1
k|k−1(ak, xk)
)
if Zk = ∅ or, if Zk = {yk}, by:
rk|k =
(1− pf ) Ψ1 + pfκ(yk)
(1− pf )(Ψ0 − rk|k−1Ψ) + pfκ(yk) rk|k−1 (23)
p0k|k(xk) =
(1− pf ) `(yk|xk) + pfκ(yk)
(1− pf ) Ψ0 + pfκ(yk) p
0
k|k−1(xk) (24)
p1k|k(ak, xk) =
(1− pf ) `(yk|ak, xk) + pfκ(yk)
(1− pf ) Ψ1 + pfκ(yk) p
1
k|k−1(ak, xk) (25)
where
Ψ0
4
=
∫
`(yk|xk) p0k|k−1(xk) dxk (26)
Ψ1
4
=
∫∫
`(yk|ak, xk) p1k|k−1(ak, xk) dakdxk (27)
Ψ
4
= Ψ0 −Ψ1. (28)
Proof: The correction equation of the Bayes random set filter for joint attack detection and state estimation
follows from a generalization of (7), which yields
p(Ak, xk|Zk) = λ(Zk|Ak, xk) p(Ak, xk|Z
k−1)
p(Zk|Zk−1) (29)
where λ(Zk|Ak, xk) is given by (19) and (20), while
p(Zk|Zk−1) =
∫∫
λ(Zk|Ak, xk) p(Ak, xk|Zk−1) δAkdxk
=
∫
λ(Zk|∅, xk) p(∅, xk|Zk−1) dxk +
∫∫
λ(Zk|{ak}, xk) p({ak}, xk|Zk−1) dakdxk. (30)
For the case Zk = ∅, the above reduces to
p(∅|Zk−1) = 1− pd (31)
by substituting (19)-(20) and (21) in (30), and simply noting that
∫
p0k|k−1(xk)dxk = 1 and
∫∫
p1k|k−1(ak, xk) dakdxk =
1. The posterior probability of attack existence rk|k can be obtained from the posterior density (29) with Ak = ∅
via
rk|k = 1−
∫
p(∅, xk|Zk) dxk (32)
where - using (19), (21) and (31) in (29) - we have
p(∅, xk|Zk) = (1− rk|k−1) p0k|k−1(xk). (33)
8Moreover, p0k|k(xk) = p(∅, xk|Zk)/(1−rk|k), and the joint density for the system under attack can be easily derived
from the posterior density with Ak = {ak} by recalling that p1k|k(ak, xk) = p({ak}, xk|Zk)/rk|k, where
p({ak}, xk|Zk) = rk|k−1 · p1k|k−1(ak, xk) (34)
results from replacing (20), (21) and (31) in (29). Notice that from the set integral definition (15), and densities
(33)-(34), it holds that
∫
p(∅, xk|Zk) dxk +
∫∫
p({ak}, xk|Zk) dakdxk = 1. Hence, as stated, the Bayes correction
(22) provides a hybrid Bernoulli density. Next, for the case Zk = {yk}, (30) leads to
p({yk}|Zk−1) = pd
[
(1− pf )(Ψ1 − rk|k−1Ψ) + pfκ(yk)
]
(35)
so that from (29) one gets
p(∅, xk|Zk) =
[
(1− pf ) `(yk|xk) + pfκ(yk)
]
(1− pf )(Ψ1 − rk|k−1Ψ) + pfκ(yk) (1− rk|k−1) p
0
k|k−1(xk) (36)
which, in turn, is used to obtain (23) through (32). Once rk|k is known, (24) immediately follows as previously
shown for the case Zk = ∅, while (25) comes from dividing the posterior
p({ak}, xk|Zk) =
[
(1− pf ) `(yk|xk) + pfκ(yk)
]
(1− pf )(Ψ1 − rk|k−1Ψ) + pfκ(yk)rk|k−1 p
1
k|k−1(ak, xk) (37)
by rk|k in (23).
2) Extra packet injection: A complete derivation of the correction step for the extra packet injection model
introduced in Section II-A can be found in Forti et al. [18] We summarize below the main results, since they are the
basis for the derivation of the Gaussian-mixture filter of Section 4. First recall that, in this case, the measurement
set Zk is given by the union of the two independent random sets Yk and Fk. Clearly, in view of (5), Yk is a
Bernoulli random set whose cardinality is either 0 or 1 depending on whether the system-originated measurement
yk is delivered or not. Conversely, it is supposed that no prior knowledge on the number of fake measurements,
i.e. the cardinality of Fk, is available. Accordingly, ρ(n) is taken as an uninformative distribution and, hence, the
FISST PDF of fake-only measurements turns out to be
γ(Fk) ∝ |Fk|!
∏
yk∈Fk
κ(yk) (38)
where κ(yk) is a PDF describing the distribution of fake measurements on the measurement space Y. Clearly, if
no prior knowledge on such a distribution can be assumed, the same approach of Section 2.1 can be followed by
taking κ(yk) as an uninformative (i.e. uniform) PDF over Y. The following result holds.
Theorem 2: (Correction under extra packet injection attack, Forti et al. [18]) Suppose that the prior density at
time k is hybrid Bernoulli of the form
p(Ak, xk|Zk−1) =
{
(1− rk|k−1) p0k|k−1(xk), if Ak = ∅
rk|k−1 · p1k|k−1(ak, xk), if Ak = {ak}
. (39)
Then, given the measurement random set Zk defined in (4), also the posterior density at time k turns out to be
hybrid Bernoulli of the form
p(Ak, xk|Zk) =
{
(1− rk|k) p0k|k(xk), if Ak = ∅
rk|k · p1k|k(ak, xk), if Ak = {ak}
(40)
completely specified by the triplet
rk|k =
1− pd (1− Γ1)
1− pd[1− (Γ0 − rk|k−1Γ)] rk|k−1 (41)
p0k|k(xk) =
1− pd + pd
∑
yk∈Zk
`(yk|xk)
nκ(yk)
1− pd (1− Γ0) p
0
k|k−1(xk) (42)
p1k|k(ak, xk) =
1− pd + pd
∑
yk∈Zk
`(yk|ak, xk)
nκ(yk)
1− pd (1− Γ1) p
1
k|k−1(ak, xk) (43)
9where
Γ0
4
=
∑
yk∈Zk
∫
`(yk|xk) p0k|k−1(xk) dxk
nκ(yk)
(44)
Γ1
4
=
∑
yk∈Zk
∫∫
`(yk|ak, xk) p1k|k−1(ak, xk) dakdxk
nκ(yk)
(45)
and Γ
4
= Γ0 − Γ1.
B. Dynamic model and prediction
Let us now focus on the prediction step of the Bayesian hybrid Bernoulli filter. Concerning the propagation of
the signal attack from time k to time k+ 1, we consider the most general model for signal attacks where any value
can be injected and, accordingly, we model ak+1 as a completely unknown input whose value does not depend on
the values ak and xk of attack and, respectively, state at time k. However, concerning the existence of the attack at
time k+ 1, we introduce two parameters ps and pb to model the fact that the presence of an attack at time k+ 1 is
more probable when an attack is already present at time k: pb denotes the probability that an attack ak+1 is launched
to the system at time k + 1 when the system is under normal operation at time k; ps denotes the probability that
an adversarial action affecting the system at time k will endure to time k + 1. Notice that the probabilities pb and
ps have to be regarded as design parameters for the filter that can be tuned depending on the desired properties:
the lower is pb the more cautious will be the filter in declaring the presence of an attack; the higher is ps the more
cautious will be the filter in declaring that the attack has disappeared. According to this model, the transition density
pi(Ak+1|Ak) of the attack BRS takes the form
pi(Ak+1|∅) =
{
1− pb, if Ak+1 = ∅
pb p(ak+1), if Ak+1 = {ak+1}
pi(Ak+1|{ak}) =
{
1− ps, if Ak+1 = ∅
ps p(ak+1), if Ak+1 = {ak+1}
Like in Section 2.2, p(ak+1) is the PDF summarizing the available knowledge on ak+1, which can be taken equal
to an uninformative PDF (e.g., uniform over the attack space) when the attack vector is completely unknown.
Then, the joint transition density of (A, x) at time k + 1 takes the form
pi(Ak+1, xk+1|Ak, xk) = pi(xk+1|Ak, xk)pi(Ak+1|Ak) (46)
where, in accordance with (1), we have
pi(xk+1|Ak, xk) =
{
pi(xk+1|xk), if Ak = ∅
pi(xk+1|ak, xk), if Ak = {ak}
(47)
with pi(xk+1|xk) and pi(xk+1|ak, xk) known Markov transition PDFs.
Under the above assumptions, Forti et al. [18] obtained an exact recursion for the prior density.
Theorem 3: (Forti et al. [18]) Given the posterior hybrid Bernoulli density p(Ak, xk|Zk) at time k of the form
(22), fully characterized by the triplet
(
rk|k, p0k|k(xk), p
1
k|k(ak, xk)
)
, also the predicted density turns out to be hybrid
Bernoulli of the form
p(Ak+1, xk+1|Zk) =
{
(1− rk+1|k) p0k+1|k(xk+1), if Ak+1 = ∅
rk+1|k · p1k+1|k(ak+1, xk+1), if Ak+1 = {ak+1}
(48)
with
rk+1|k = (1− rk|k) pb + rk|k ps (49)
p0k+1|k(xk+1) =
(1− rk|k)(1− pb) pk+1|k(xk+1|∅)
1− rk+1|k +
rk|k(1− ps) pk+1|k(xk+1|{ak})
1− rk+1|k (50)
p1k+1|k(ak+1, xk+1) =
(1− rk|k) pb pk+1|k(xk+1|∅) p(ak+1)
rk+1|k
+
rk|k ps pk+1|k(xk+1|{ak}) p(ak+1)
rk+1|k
(51)
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where
pk+1|k(xk+1|∅) =
∫
pi(xk+1|xk) p0k|k(xk) dxk (52)
pk+1|k(xk+1|{ak}) =
∫∫
pi(xk+1|ak, xk) p1k|k(ak, xk) dakdxk. (53)
Notice that, if pb = 0, ps = 1 and rk|k = 1, it follows that rk+1|k = 1 and p1k+1|k(ak+1, xk+1) =
pk+1|k(xk+1|{ak}) p(ak+1). Hence, in this case, we recover the standard Chapman–Kolmogorov equation (9) for
the system under attack.
Remark 1: Given the conditional density p(Ak, xk|Zk), characterized by the triplet
(
rk|k, p0k|k(·), p1k|k(·, ·)
)
, the
joint attack detection and state estimation problem can be solved as follows. First of all, we perform attack detection
using rk|k from the available current hybrid Bernoulli density p(Ak, xk|Zk). By using a MAP decision rule, given Zk,
the detector will assign Aˆk 6= ∅ (the system is under attack) if and only if Prob(Ak 6= ∅|Zk) > Prob(Ak = ∅|Zk),
i.e. if and only if rk|k > 1/2. Then, if the signal attack has been detected, one can maximize p(Ak, xk|Zk) with
respect to xk and ak. In this way it is possible to obtain a MAP estimate of xk and an ML estimate of the unknown
attack input ak.
Remark 2: The Bayesian formulation of this section has allowed to generalize the standard joint input and state
filtering process to take into account several practically relevant issues like the switching nature of the attack input,
the injection of fake measurements or replacement of system-originated by fake measurements, and the possible
lack of system-originated measurements. Please notice that all such phenomena are not contemplated in the standard
filtering process.
Remark 3: The HBRS Bayesian filtering recursions derived in this section are rarely solvable in explicit form
but, as it will be shown in the next section, this is possible in the linear-Gaussian case. In such a case, in fact, the
propagated PDFs p0k|k(·) and p1k|k(·, ·) turn out to be Gaussian mixtures at any time k, even if with a number of
Gaussian components growing with time and hence to be reduced via suitable pruning & merging procedures.
Remark 4: It is clear from the previous derivations that the defense method against signal attacks is embedded
in the proposed hybrid Bernoulli filter and can be coordinated with any of the defense methods against the two
considered data attacks, either packet substitution or extra packet injection. In fact, it suffices to perform the correction
step of the HBF according to either Theorem 1 or Theorem 2 while the prediction step is clearly unaffected by
the choice of the data attack model. Please notice that packet substitution and extra packet injection attacks are
clearly alternative and that the HBF can switch from counteracting one or the other at any time, just by choosing
the appropriate correction step, depending on whether the system monitor receives a single or multiple data packets
during the sampling interval. The above described strategy could, therefore, provide a sensible way to coordinate
the defense methods against packet substitution and extra packet injection cyber-attacks.
IV. BAYESIAN RANDOM SET FILTER FOR JOINT ATTACK DETECTION AND STATE ESTIMATION –
THE NO DIRECT FEEDTHROUGH CASE
Suppose now that, even when the attack input is present, there is no direct feedthrough from the attack ak to
the output yk, so that the measurement model is
yk = h(xk) + vk (54)
irrespectively of the presence of the attack. In this case, clearly, the attack set Ak must be estimated with one step
delay, since Zk+1 is the first measurement set containing information on Ak. In the following sections, a detailed
derivation of the correction and prediction steps of the Bayes recursion in the case of no direct feedthrough is
provided.
A. Measurement models and correction
In the case of packet substitution with no direct feedthrough, the likelihood function λ(Zk|xk) takes the following
form:
λ(Zk|xk) =
{
1− pd, if Zk = ∅
pd
[
(1− pf ) `(yk|xk) + pf κ(yk)
]
, if Zk = {yk}
(55)
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where `(yk|xk) is the standard likelihood function of the system-generated measurement yk. It is easy to check that
the likelihood function λ(Zk|xk) integrates to one.
Instead, in the case of extra packet injection attack with no direct feedthrough, it can be shown that the likelihood
function λ(Zk|xk) can be written as
λ(Zk|xk) = γ(Zk)
1− pd + pd ∑
yk∈Zk
`(yk|xk)
nκ(yk)
 (56)
where n denotes the cardinality of Zk, i.e. the number of received measurements.
Hence, the following result holds (the proof is omitted since it follows along the same lines as the proofs of
Theorems 1 and 2).
Theorem 4: (Correction without direct feedthrough) Suppose that the prior density at time k is hybrid Bernoulli
of the form
p(Ak−1, xk|Zk−1) =
{
(1− rk|k−1) p0k|k−1(xk), if Ak−1 = ∅
rk|k−1 · p1k|k−1(ak−1, xk), if Ak−1 = {ak−1}
. (57)
Then, given the measurement random set Zk for packet substitution attack, also the posterior density at time k turns
out to be hybrid Bernoulli of the form
p(Ak−1, xk|Zk) =
{
(1− rk|k) p0k|k(xk), if Ak−1 = ∅
rk|k · p1k|k(ak−1, xk), if Ak−1 = {ak−1}
(58)
The triplet
(
rk|k, p0k|k(xk), p
1
k|k(ak−1, xk)
)
completely specifying the posterior density can be computed as in
Theorem 1 for the case of packet substitution and as in Theorem 2 for the case of extra packet injection attack,
provided that ak, Ak, and `(yk|ak, xk) are replaced by ak−1, Ak−1, and `(yk|xk), respectively.
B. Dynamic model and prediction
The joint transition density takes the form
pi(Ak, xk+1|Ak−1, xk) = pi(xk+1|Ak, xk)pi(Ak|Ak−1) (59)
where
pi(xk+1|Ak, xk) =
{
pi(xk+1|xk), if Ak = ∅
pi(xk+1|ak, xk), if Ak = {ak}
(60)
with pi(xk+1|xk) and pi(xk+1|ak, xk) known Markov transition PDFs.
The transition density pi(Ak|Ak−1) of the attack BRS takes the form
pi(Ak|∅) =
{
1− pb, if Ak = ∅
pb p(ak), if Ak = {ak}
pi(Ak|{ak−1}) =
{
1− ps, if Ak = ∅
ps p(ak), if Ak = {ak}
p(ak) is the PDF summarizing the available knowledge on ak, which can be taken equal to an uninformative PDF
(e.g., uniform over the attack space) when the attack vector is completely unknown.
Theorem 5: Given the posterior hybrid Bernoulli density p(Ak−1, xk|Zk) at time k of the form (58), fully
characterized by the triplet
(
rk|k, p0k|k(xk), p
1
k|k(ak−1, xk)
)
, also the predicted density turns out to be hybrid Bernoulli
of the form
p(Ak, xk+1|Zk) =
{
(1− rk+1|k) p0k+1|k(xk+1), if Ak = ∅
rk+1|k · p1k+1|k(ak, xk+1), if Ak = {ak}
(61)
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with
rk+1|k = (1− rk|k) pb + rk|k ps (62)
p0k+1|k(xk+1) =
(1− rk|k)(1− pb) pk+1|k(xk+1|∅)
1− rk+1|k +
rk|k(1− ps) pk+1|k(xk+1|{ak−1})
1− rk+1|k (63)
p1k+1|k(ak, xk+1) =
(1− rk|k) pb pk+1|k(xk+1|{ak}, ∅) p(ak)
rk+1|k
+
rk|k ps pk+1|k(xk+1|{ak}, {ak−1}) p(ak)
rk+1|k
(64)
where
pk+1|k(xk+1|∅) 4=
∫
pi(xk+1|xk) p0k|k(xk) dxk (65)
pk+1|k(xk+1|{ak−1}) 4=
∫∫
pi(xk+1|xk) p1k|k(ak−1, xk) dak−1dxk (66)
pk+1|k(xk+1|{ak}, ∅) 4=
∫
pi(xk+1|ak, xk) p0k|k(xk) dxk (67)
pk+1|k(xk+1|{ak}, {ak−1}) 4=
∫∫
pi(xk+1|ak, xk) p1k|k(ak−1, xk) dak−1dxk. (68)
Proof: The prediction equation is given by the following generalization of (12)
p(Ak, xk+1|Zk) =
∫∫
pi(Ak, xk+1|Ak−1, xk) p(Ak−1, xk|Zk) δAk−1dxk
= (1− rk|k)
∫
pi(Ak, xk+1|∅, xk) p0k|k(xk) dxk
+ rk|k
∫∫
pi(Ak, xk+1|{ak−1}, xk) p1k|k(ak−1, xk) dak−1dxk
Then, for Ak = ∅, one has
p(∅, xk+1|Zk) = (1− rk|k)(1− pb)
∫
pi(xk+1|xk) p0k|k(xk) dxk
+ rk|k(1− ps)
∫∫
pi(xk+1|xk) p1k|k(ak−1, xk) dak−1dxk
= (1− rk|k) (1− pb) pk+1|k(xk+1|∅) + rk|k (1− ps) pk+1|k(xk+1|{ak−1}).
Analogously, for Ak = {ak} we obtain
p({ak}, xk+1|Zk) =
[
(1− rk|k) pb pk+1|k(xk+1|{ak}, ∅) + rk|k ps pk+1|k(xk+1|{ak}, {ak−1})
]
p(ak).
Thus, the output of the prediction step is of the form (61), fully specified by (62)-(64).
V. GAUSSIAN-MIXTURE HYBRID BERNOULLI FILTER
While in general no exact closed-form solution to the proposed hybrid Bernoulli filter is admitted, for
the special class of linear Gaussian models, this problem can be effectively mitigated by parameterizing the
posterior densities p0k|k(·) and p1k|k(·, ·) via Gaussian mixtures (GMs) so as to derive a GM hybrid Bernoulli
filter. This approach can be generalized to nonlinear models and/or non-Gaussian noises via nonlinear
extensions of the GM approximation based on nonlinear filtering techniques such as the Extended Kalman
Filter or the Unscented Kalman filter. In what follows, a detailed derivation of the GM hybrid Bernoulli
filter for linear-Gaussian models is provided. For the sake of brevity, only the direct feedthrough case
(Section III) is considered. The GM implementation in the case of no direct feedthrough (Section IV)
can be derived in a similar way.
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Denoting by N (x;m,P ) a Gaussian PDF in the variable x, with mean m and covariance P , the
closed-form GM hybrid Bernoulli filter assumes linear Gaussian observation, transition, and (a priori)
attack models, i.e.
`(yk|xk) = N (yk;Cxk, R) (69)
`(yk|ak, xk) = N (yk;Cxk +Hak, R) (70)
pi(xk+1|xk) = N (xk+1;Axk, Q) (71)
pi(xk+1|ak, xk) = N (xk+1;Axk +Gak, Q) (72)
p(a) =
Ja∑
j=1
ω˜a,jN (a; a˜j , P˜ a,j) (73)
Note that (73) uses given model parameters Ja, ω˜a,j , a˜j , P˜ a,j , j = 1, . . . , Ja, to define the a priori PDF
of the signal attack, here expressed as a Gaussian mixture and supposed time independent.
In the GM implementation, each probability density at time k is represented by the following set of
parameters(
rk|k, p0k|k(xk), p
1
k|k(ak, xk)
)
=
(
rk|k,
{
ω0,jk|k,m
0,j
k|k, P
0,j
k|k
}J0k|k
j=1 ,
{
ω1,jk|k,m
1,j
k|k, P
1,j
k|k
}J1k|k
j=1
)
(74)
where ω and J indicate, respectively, weights and number of mixture components, such that
p0k|k(xk) =
J0k|k∑
j=1
ω0,jk|kN (m0,jk|k, P 0,jk|k) (75)
p1k|k(ak, xk) =
J1k|k∑
j=1
ω1,jk|kN (m1,jk|k, P 1,jk|k) (76)
with m0k|k = xˆ
0
k|k, m
1
k|k = [xˆ
1T
k|k, aˆ
T
k ]
T , P 0k|k
4
= E[(xk − xˆ0k|k)(xk − xˆ0k|k)T ], P 1k|k =
[
P 1xk|k P
xa
k
P axk P
a
k
]
, and
P 1xk|k
4
= E[(xk − xˆ1k|k)(xk − xˆ1k|k)T ], (P xak )T = P axk
4
= E[(ak − aˆk)(xk − xˆ1k|k)T ], P ak
4
= E[(ak − aˆk)(ak −
aˆk)
T ]. The weights are such that
∑J0k|k
j=1 ω
0,j
k|k = 1, and
∑J1k|k
j=1 ω
1,j
k|k = 1.
The Gaussian Mixture implementation of the Hybrid Bernoulli Filter (GM-HBF) is described as
follows.
A. GM-HBF correction for packet substitution
Proposition 1: Suppose that: assumptions (69)-(73) hold; the measurement set Zk is defined by (3);
the predicted FISST density at time k is fully specified by the triplet
(
rk|k−1, p0k|k−1(xk), p
1
k|k−1(ak, xk)
)
;
p0k|k−1(·), p1k|k−1(·, ·) are Gaussian mixtures of the form
p0k|k−1(xk) =
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,jk|k−1N (m0,jk|k−1, P 0,jk|k−1) (77)
p1k|k−1(ak, xk) =
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
ω1,jk|k−1N (m1,jk|k−1, P 1,jk|k−1) (78)
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Then, the posterior FISST density
(
rk|k, p0k|k(xk), p
1
k|k(ak, xk)
)
is given by
rk|k =
(1− pf ) Ψ1 + pfκ(yk)
(1− pf )(Ψ0 − rk|k−1Ψ) + pfκ(yk) rk|k−1 (79)
p0k|k(xk) =
J0k|k∑
j=1
ω0,jk|kN (m0,jk|k, P 0,jk|k) =
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,jF,k|kN (m0,jk|k−1, P 0,jk|k−1) +
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,j
F¯ ,k|kN (m
0,j
k|k, P
0,j
k|k)
(80)
p1k|k(ak, xk) =
J1k|k∑
j=1
ω1,jk|kN (m1,jk|k, P 1,jk|k) =
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
ω1,jF,k|kN (m1,jk|k−1, P 1,jk|k−1) +
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
ω1,j
F¯ ,k|kN (m
1,j
k|k, P
1,j
k|k)
(81)
where
ωi,jF,k|k =
pf κ(yk)ω
i,j
k|k−1
(1− pf )Ψi + pfκ(yk) , (82)
ωi,j
F¯ ,k|k =
(1− pf )ωi,jk|k−1
(1− pf )Ψi + pf κ(yk) q
i,j
k (yk) (83)
for i = 0, 1, while
q0,jk (yk) = N (y;Cm0,jk|k−1, CP 0,jk|k−1CT +R) (84)
q1,jk (yk) = N (y; C˜m1,jk|k−1, C˜P 1,jk|k−1C˜T +R) (85)
with C˜
4
= [C,H], Ψ0 =
∑J0k|k−1
j=1 ω
0,j
k|k−1q
0,j
k (yk), and Ψ1 =
∑J1k|k−1
j=1 ω
1,j
k|k−1q
1,j
k (yk).
Proof: From Theorem 1, the corrected probability of signal attack existence is provided by (23) where
Ψ0 is obtained by substituting (69) and (77) into (26), so that
Ψ0 =
∫
N (y;Cxk, R)
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,jk|k−1N (m0,jk|k−1, P 0,jk|k−1) dxk. (86)
Then, by applying a standard result for Gaussian functions, [30, Lemma 1] we can write∫
N (y;Cxk, R)N (m0,jk|k−1, P 0,jk|k−1) dxk = q0,jk (yk) (87)
where q0,jk (yk) is given by (84) and, hence, (86) takes the form
Ψ0 =
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,jk|k−1q
0,j
k (yk). (88)
Moreover, Ψ1 in (79) can be analogously obtained by substituting (70) and (78) into (27), and by applying
Lemma 1 in Vo and Ma [30] to the (double) integral
∫∫ N (y;Cxk+Hak, R)N (m1,jk|k−1, P 1,jk|k−1) dakdxk,
so as to obtain
Ψ1 =
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
ω1,jk|k−1q
1,j
k (yk) (89)
where q1,j(yk) is given by (85) and m
1,j
k|k−1 = [(xˆ
1
k|k−1)
T , (aˆjk)
T ]T .
Next, the posterior density p0k|k(·) can be derived from (24) in Theorem 1 as
p0k|k(xk) =
pf κ(yk)
(1− pf ) Ψ0 + pf κ(yk) p
0
k|k−1(xk) +
(1− pf ) `(yk|xk)
(1− pf ) Ψ0 + pf κ(yk) p
0
k|k−1(xk). (90)
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By substituting (69) and (77) into (90), we obtain
p0k|k(xk) =
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
pf κ(yk)ω
0,j
k|k−1
(1− pf ) Ψ0 + pf κ(yk) N (m
0,j
k|k−1, P
0,j
k|k−1)
+
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
(1− pf )ω0,jk|k−1N (y;Cxk, R)
(1− pf ) Ψ0 + pf κ(yk) N (m
0,j
k|k−1, P
0,j
k|k−1). (91)
Then, by applying Lemma 2 in Vo and Ma, [30] we can write
N (y;Cxk, R)N (m0,jk|k−1, P 0,jk|k−1) = q0,jk (yk)N (m0,jk|k, P 0,jk|k) (92)
where q0,jk (yk) has been defined in (84), while m
0,j
k|k, P
0,j
k|k have been introduced in (75).
In the special case of linear Gaussian models, m0,jk|k and P
0,j
k|k can be easily calculated following the
standard Bayes filter correction step, which in this case boils down to the standard Kalman filter for linear
discrete-time systems [28]:
m0,jk|k = m
0,j
k|k−1 + L
0,j
k (yk − Cm0,jk|k−1) (93)
P 0,jk|k = (I − L0,jk C)P 0,jk|k−1 (94)
where
L0,jk = P
0,j
k|k−1C
T (S0,jk )
−1 (95)
S0,jk = CP
0,j
k|k−1C
T +R. (96)
Thus, by substituting (92) into (91) with means and covariances given by (93)-(94), we can write
p0k|k(xk) =
J0k|k∑
j=1
ω0,jk|kN (m0,jk|k, P 0,jk|k) (97)
which consists of 2 J0k|k−1 Gaussian components, i.e.
p0k|k(xk) =
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,jF,k|kN (m0,jk|k−1, P 0,jk|k−1) +
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,j
F¯ ,k|kN (m
0,j
k|k, P
0,j
k|k) (98)
with weights ω0,jF,k|k, ω
0,j
F¯ ,k|k given by (82)-(83) for i = 0. Note that, as it can be seen from (98), it turns
out that J0k|k = 2 J
0
k|k−1, where the first legacy (not corrected) components correspond to the hypothesis
of the system-originated measurement being replaced by a fake one yfk , while the remaining components
are the ones corrected under the hypothesis of receiving yk with probability 1− pf .
Following the same rationale, analogous results can be obtained for p1k|k(·, ·), with the exception that
also signal attack estimation has to be performed. By substituting (70) and (78) into (25) in Theorem 1,
we obtain
p1k|k(ak, xk) =
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
pf κ(yk)ω
1,j
k|k−1
(1− pf ) Ψ1 + pf κ(yk)N (m
1,j
k|k−1, P
1,j
k|k−1)
+
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
(1− pf )ω1,jk|k−1N (y;Cxk +Hak, R)
(1− pf ) Ψ1 + pf κ(yk) N (m
1,j
k|k−1, P
1,j
k|k−1). (99)
Then, by applying Lemma 2 in Vo and Ma, [30] we can write
N (y;Cxk +Hak, R)N (m1,jk|k−1, P 1,jk|k−1) = q1,jk (yk)N (m1,jk|k, P 1,jk|k) (100)
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where q1,jk (yk) has been defined in (85), while m
1,j
k|k, P
1,j
k|k have been introduced in (76). For linear Gaussian
models, m1,jk|k and P
1,j
k|k can be calculated following the correction step of the filter for joint input and state
estimation of linear discrete-time systems [28], introduced in Section II-B. In particular, m1,jk|k consists of:
xˆ1,jk|k = xˆ
1,j
k|k−1 + L˜
1,j
k (yk − Cxˆ1,jk|k−1 −Haˆjk) = xˆ1,jk|k−1 + L1,jk (yk − Cxˆ1,jk|k−1) (101)
aˆjk = M
j
k(yk − Cxˆ1,jk|k−1) (102)
where
L1,jk = L˜
1,j
k (I −HM jk) (103)
L˜1,jk = P
1x,j
k|k−1C
T (S1,jk )
−1 (104)
S1,jk = CP
1x,j
k|k−1C
T +R (105)
M jk =
[
HT (S1,jk )
−1H
]−1
HT (S1,jk )
−1. (106)
The elements composing P 1,jk|k can be computed as
P 1x,jk|k = (I − L1,jk C)P 1x,jk|k−1 (107)
P a,jk = [H
T (S1,jk )
−1H]−1 (108)
P xa,jk = (P
ax,j
k )
T = −L˜1,jk HP a,jk . (109)
Thus, by substituting (100) into (99) with means and covariances given by (101)-(102) and (107)-(109),
we can write
p1k|k(ak, xk) =
J1k|k∑
j=1
ω1,jk|kN (m1,jk|k, P 1,jk|k) (110)
which comprises 2 J1k|k−1 components, i.e.
p1k|k(ak, xk) =
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
ω1,jF,k|kN (m1,jk|k−1, P 1,jk|k−1) +
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
ω1,j
F¯ ,k|kN (m
1,j
k|k, P
1,j
k|k) (111)
with weights ω1,jF,k|k, ω
1,j
F¯ ,k|k given by (82)-(83) for i = 1.
B. GM-HBF correction for extra packet injection
Proposition 2: Suppose that: assumptions (69)-(73) hold; the measurement set Zk is defined by (4);
the predicted FISST density at time k is fully specified by the triplet
(
rk|k−1, p0k|k−1(xk), p
1
k|k−1(ak, xk)
)
;
p0k|k−1(·), p1k|k−1(·, ·) are Gaussian mixtures of the form (77) and (78), respectively. Then, the posterior
FISST density
(
rk|k, p0k|k(xk), p
1
k|k(ak, xk)
)
is given by
rk|k =
1− pd + pd Γ1
1− pd + pd(1− rk|k−1) Γ0 + pd rk|k−1Γ1 rk|k−1 (112)
p0k|k(xk) =
J0k|k∑
j=1
ω0,jk|kN (m0,jk|k, P 0,jk|k) =
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,j
D¯,k|kN (m
0,j
k|k−1, P
0,j
k|k−1) +
∑
yk∈Zk
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,jD,k|kN (m0,jk|k, P 0,jk|k)
(113)
p1k|k(ak, xk) =
J1k|k∑
j=1
ω1,jk|kN (m1,jk|k, P 1,jk|k) =
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
ω1,j
D¯,k|kN (m
1,j
k|k−1, P
1,j
k|k−1) +
∑
yk∈Zk
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
ω1,jD,k|kN (m1,jk|k, P 1,jk|k)
(114)
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where, for i = 0, 1,
ωi,j
D¯,k|k =
(1− pd)ωi,jk|k−1
1− pd + pd Γi , (115)
ωi,jD,k|k =
pd ω
i,j
k|k−1q
i,j
k (yk)
(1− pd + pd Γi)nκ(yk) (116)
and
Γ0 =
∑
yk∈Zk
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,jk|k−1
nκ(yk)
q0,jk (yk) (117)
Γ1 =
∑
yk∈Zk
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
ω1,jk|k−1
nκ(yk)
q1,jk (yk). (118)
Proof: We first derive the corrected probability of signal attack existence, which can be directly written
from (41) as
rk|k =
1− pd + pd Γ1
1− pd + pd(1− rk|k−1) Γ0 + pd rk|k−1Γ1
rk|k−1 (119)
where Γ0 is obtained by substituting (69) and (77) into (44), so that
Γ0 =
∑
yk∈Zk
∫
N (y;Cxk, R)
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,jk|k−1N (m0,jk|k−1, P 0,jk|k−1) dxk
nκ(yk)
. (120)
Then, by applying (87), (120) takes the form (117). Moreover, Γ1 in (119) can be analogously obtained
by substituting (70) and (78) into (45), and by applying (100) which leads to (118).
Next, the posterior density p0k|k(·) can be derived from (42) in Theorem 2 as
p0k|k(xk) =
1− pd
1− pd + pdΓ0 p
0
k|k−1(xk) +
pd
1− pd + pdΓ0
∑
yk∈Zk
`(yk|xk)
nκ(yk)
p0k|k−1(xk). (121)
By substituting (69) and (77) into (121), we obtain
p0k|k(xk) =
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
1− pd
1− pd + pdΓ0 ω
0,j
k|k−1N (m0,jk|k−1, P 0,jk|k−1)
+
∑
yk∈Zk
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,jk|k−1
pd
1− pd + pdΓ0
N (y;Cxk, R)
nκ(yk)
N (m0,jk|k−1, P 0,jk|k−1). (122)
Thus, by substituting (87) into (122), with means and covariances given by (93)-(94), we can write
p0k|k(xk) =
J0k|k∑
j=1
ω0,jk|kN (m0,jk|k, P 0,jk|k) (123)
which comprises J0k|k−1(1 + |Zk|) components, where |Zk| denotes the cardinality of the measurement
set Z at time k, i.e.
p0k|k(xk) =
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,j
D¯,k|kN (m
0,j
k|k−1, P
0,j
k|k−1) +
∑
yk∈Zk
J0k|k−1∑
j=1
ω0,jD,k|kN (m0,jk|k, P 0,jk|k) (124)
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with weights
ω0,j
D¯,k|k =
(1− pd)ω0,jk|k−1
1− pd + pd
∑
yk∈Zk
J0k|k−1∑
h=1
ω0,hk|k−1
nκ(yk)
q0,hk (yk)
ω0,jD,k|k =
pd ω
0,j
k|k−1q
0,j
k (yk)[
1− pd + pd
∑
yk∈Zk
J0k|k−1∑
h=1
ω0,hk|k−1
nκ(yk)
q0,hk (yk)
]
nκ(yk)
.
Note that, as it can be seen from (124), it turns out that J0k|k = J
0
k|k−1 + |Zk| J0k|k−1 = J0k|k−1(1 + |Zk|),
where the first legacy components correspond to the fact that no measurement has been delivered and
hence no update is carried out, while the remaining components are the ones corrected when one or
multiple measurements are received.
Following the same rationale, analogous results can be obtained for p1k|k(·, ·). From (43) in Theorem 2:
p1k|k(ak, xk) =
1− pd
1− pd + pdΓ1 p
1
k|k−1(ak, xk) +
pd
1− pd + pdΓ1
∑
yk∈Zk
`(yk|ak, xk)
nκ(yk)
p1k|k−1(ak, xk). (125)
By substituting (70) and (78) into (125), we obtain
p1k|k(ak, xk) =
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
1− pd
1− pd + pdΓ1 ω
1,j
k|k−1N (m1,jk|k−1, P 1,jk|k−1) (126)
+
∑
yk∈Zk
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
ω1,jk|k−1
pd
1− pd + pdΓ1
N (y;Cxk +Hak, R)
nκ(yk)
N (m1,jk|k−1, P 1,jk|k−1).
Thus, by substituting (100) into (126), with means and covariances given by (101)-(102) and (107)-(109),
we can write
p1k|k(ak, xk) =
J1k|k∑
j=1
ω1,jk|kN (m1,jk|k, P 1,jk|k) (127)
which comprises J1k|k−1(1 + |Zk|) components, i.e.
p1k|k(ak, xk) =
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
ω1,j
D¯,k|kN (m
1,j
k|k−1, P
1,j
k|k−1) +
∑
yk∈Zk
J1k|k−1∑
j=1
ω1,jD,k|kN (m1,jk|k, P 1,jk|k) (128)
with weights
ω1,j
D¯,k|k =
(1− pd)ω1,jk|k−1
1− pd + pd
∑
yk∈Zk
J1k|k−1∑
h=1
ω1,hk|k−1
nκ(yk)
q1,hk (yk)
ω1,jD,k|k =
pd ω
1,j
k|k−1q
1,j
k (yk)[
1− pd + pd
∑
yk∈Zk
J1k|k−1∑
h=1
ω1,hk|k−1
nκ(yk)
q1,hk (yk)
]
nκ(yk)
.
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C. GM-HBF prediction
Proposition 3: Suppose assumptions (69)-(73) hold, the posterior FISST density at time k is fully
specified by the triplet
(
rk|k, p0k|k(xk), p
1
k|k(ak, xk)
)
, and p0k|k(·), p1k|k(·, ·) are Gaussian mixtures of the
form (75)-(76). Then the predicted FISST density
(
rk+1|k, p0k+1|k(xk+1), p
1
k+1|k(ak+1, xk+1)
)
is given by
rk+1|k = (1− rk|k) pb + rk|k ps (129)
p0k+1|k(xk+1) =
J0k+1|k∑
j=1
ω0,jk+1|kN (m0,jk+1|k, P 0,jk+1|k) (130)
p1k+1|k(ak+1, xk+1) =
J1k+1|k∑
j=1
ω1,jk+1|kN (m1,jk+1|k, P 1,jk+1|k) (131)
where (130) comprises J0k+1|k = J
0
k|k + J
1
k|k components, i.e.
p0k+1|k(xk+1) =
J0k|k∑
j=1
ω0,j
B¯,k+1|kN (m
0,j
B¯,k+1|k, P
0,j
B¯,k+1|k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
no attack-birth
+
J1k|k∑
j=1
ω0,j
S¯,k+1|kN (m
0,j
S¯,k+1|k, P
0,j
S¯,k+1|k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
no attack-survival
(132)
with
m0,j
B¯,k+1|k = Am
0,j
k|k (133)
P 0,j
B¯,k+1|k = AP
0,j
k|kA
T +Q (134)
ω0,j
B¯,k+1|k =
(1− rk|k)(1− pb)
1− rk+1|k
ω0,jk|k (135)
and
m0,j
S¯,k+1|k = A˜m
1,j
k|k (136)
P 0,j
S¯,k+1|k = A˜P
1,j
k|kA˜
T +Q (137)
ω0,j
S¯,k+1|k =
rk|k (1− ps)
1− rk+1|k
ω1,jk|k (138)
where A˜
4
= [A,G]. Moreover, (131) comprises J1k+1|k = J
a(J0k|k + J
1
k|k) components, i.e.
p1k+1|k(ak+1, xk+1) =
J0k|k∑
j=1
Ja∑
h=1
ω1,jhB,k+1|kN (m1,jhB,k+1|k, P 1,jhB,k+1|k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
attack-birth
+
J1k|k∑
j=1
Ja∑
h=1
ω1,jhS,k+1|kN (m1,jhS,k+1|k, P 1,jhS,k+1|k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
attack-survival
(139)
where
m1,jhB,k+1|k =
[
Am0,jk|k
a˜h
]
(140)
P 1,jhB,k+1|k =
[
AP 0,jk|kA
T +Q 0
0 P˜ a,h
]
(141)
ω1,jhB,k+1|k =
(1− rk|k) pb
rk+1|k
ω0,jk|k ω˜
a,h (142)
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and
m1,jhS,k+1|k =
[
A˜m1,jk|k
a˜h
]
(143)
P 1,jhS,k+1|k =
[
A˜P 1,jk|kA˜
T +Q 0
0 P˜ a,h
]
(144)
ω1,jhS,k+1|k =
rk|k ps
rk+1|k
ω1,jk|k ω˜
a,h. (145)
Proof: The predicted signal attack probability comes directly from (49). Let us now derive the predicted
density p0k+1|k(·). From (50) in Theorem 3:
p0k+1|k(xk+1) =
(1− rk|k) (1− pb)
1− rk+1|k
∫
pi(xk+1|xk), p0k|k(xk) dxk
+
rk|k (1− ps)
1− rk+1|k
∫∫
pi(xk+1|ak, xk), p1k|k(ak, xk) dakdxk. (146)
Using (71), (75) in the first term and (72), (76) in the second term, we can rewrite
p0k+1|k(xk+1) =
(1− rk|k) (1− pb)
1− rk+1|k
∫
N (x;Axk, Q)
J0k|k∑
j=1
ω0,jk|kN (m0,jk|k, P 0,jk|k) dxk
+
rk|k (1− ps)
1− rk+1|k
∫∫
N (x;Axk +Gak, Q)
J1k|k∑
j=1
ω1,jk|kN (m1,jk|k, P 1,jk|k) dakdxk. (147)
Hence, using Lemma 1 by Vo and Ma [30] in both the above terms, we finally derive (132):
p0k+1|k(xk+1) =
J0k|k∑
j=1
(1− rk|k) (1− pb)
1− rk+1|k
ω0,jk|kN (x;Am0,jk|k, AP 0,jk|kAT +Q)
+
J1k|k∑
j=1
rk|k (1− ps)
1− rk+1|k
ω1,jk|kN (x; A˜m1,jk|k, A˜P 1,jk|kA˜T +Q).
In a similar fashion, we can obtain p1k+1|k(·, ·). From (51) in Theorem 3:
p1k+1|k(ak+1, xk+1) =
(1− rk|k) pb
rk+1|k
∫
pi(xk+1|xk), p0k|k(xk) dxk p(a)
+
rk|k ps
rk+1|k
∫∫
pi(xk+1|ak, xk) p1k|k(ak, xk) dakdxk p(a)
which, using (71), (72), (73), (75) and (76), leads to
p1k+1|k(ak+1, xk+1) =
(1− rk|k) pb
rk+1|k
∫
N (x;Axk, Q)
J0k|k∑
j=1
ω0,jk|kN (m0,jk|k, P 0,jk|k) dxk
Ja∑
h=1
ω˜a,hN (a; a˜h, P˜ a,h)
+
rk|k ps
rk+1|k
∫∫
N (x;Axk +Gak, Q)
J1k|k∑
j=1
ω1,jk|kN (m1,jk|k, P 1,jk|k) dakdxk
Ja∑
h=1
ω˜a,hN (a; a˜h, P˜ a,h). (148)
Finally, by applying the same result on integrals of Gaussians used above, we obtain (139):
p1k+1|k(ak+1, xk+1) =
J0k|k∑
j=1
Ja∑
h=1
(1− rk|k) pb
rk+1|k
ω0,jk|k ω˜
a,hN (x;Am0,jk|k, AP 0,jk|kAT +Q)N (a; a˜h, P˜ a,h)
+
J1k|k∑
j=1
Ja∑
h=1
rk|k ps
rk+1|k
ω1,jk|k ω˜
a,hN (x; A˜m1,jk|k, A˜P 1,jk|kA˜T +Q)N (a; a˜h, P˜ a,h). (149)
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It is worth pointing out that, likewise other GM filters, also the proposed Gaussian Mixture Hybrid
Bernoulli Filter is characterized by a number of Gaussian components that increases with no bound over
time. As already noticed in the above derivation, at time k the GM-HBF requires
J0k|k =
{
2 J0k|k−1, packet substitution
J0k|k−1(1 + |Zk|), extra packet injection
, J1k|k =
{
2 J1k|k−1, packet substitution
J1k|k−1(1 + |Zk|), extra packet injection
components to exactly represent the posterior densities p0k|k(·) and p1k|k(·, ·), respectively. Here
J0k|k−1 = J
0
k−1|k−1 + J
1
k−1|k−1,
J1k|k−1 = J
a(J0k−1|k−1 + J
1
k−1|k−1)
denote the number of components generated in the prediction step. Heuristic pruning and merging
procedures [30] can be performed at each time step so as to remove low-weight components and combine
statistically close components and, hence, reduce the growing number of GM components.
Remark 5: The Gaussian-mixture implementation of this section has actually revealed a connection
between the proposed hybrid Bernoulli filter and the Kalman filter (KF) in that the former uses multiple
KFs (or EKFs/UKFs) to propagate in time means and covariances of the various components of the
Gaussian mixture (see eqns. (93)-(96), (101)-(109), (133)-(134) and (136)-(137)).
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The effectiveness of the developed tools, based on Bayesian random-set theory, for joint attack
detection and secure state estimation of cyber-physical systems has been tested on two numerical ex-
amples concerning a benchmark linear dynamical system and a standard IEEE power network case-study.
Simulations have been carried out in the presence of both signal and extra packet injection attacks as
well as uncertainty on measurement delivery. Results on the performance of the GM-HBF under packet
substitution attack are shown in Section VI-B.
A. Benchmark linear system
Let us first consider the following benchmark linear system, already used in the JISE literature [31]:
xk+1 = Axk +Gak + wk
yk = Cxk +Hak + vk
(150)
where A, C, R, and Q are the same as in Yong et al. [32], while G = [e1, e2] and H = [e3, e1], where
e1, . . . , e5 denote the canonical basis vectors. For this numerical study, the probabilities of attack-birth
and attack-survival are fixed, respectively, at pb = 0.2 and ps = 0.8. The system-generated measurement
is supposed to be delivered at the monitor/control center with probability pd = 0.98, while the initial
signal attack probability is set to r1|0 = 0.1. The initial state has been set equal to x0 = 0, whereas both
densities p0(·) and p1(·, ·) have been initialized as single Gaussian components with first guess mean
xˆ01|0 = [10, 10, 0, 0, 0]
T and covariance P 01|0 = 10
4 I5. Moreover, the first estimate of the attack vector has
been randomly initialized as a˜1|0 = [15.1, 25.53]T , with associated initial covariance matrix P˜ a1|0 = 50 I2.
The extra fake measurements are modeled as uniformly distributed over the interval [−0.3, 140.3]. Finally,
a pruning threshold γp = 10−3 and a merging threshold γm = 3 have been chosen. As shown in Fig.3,
at time k = 150 a signal attack vector a = [10, 20]T is injected into the system, persisting for 200
time steps. The proposed GM-HBF promptly detects the unknown signal attack, by simply comparing
the attack probability rk|k obtained in (41) with the threshold 0.5. Fig. 4 provides a comparison between
the true and the estimated values of states x1 and x2 (clearly the only state components affected by the
signal attack). Note that the state estimate is obtained by means of a MAP estimator, i.e. by extracting the
Gaussian mean with the highest weight from the posterior density p0(·) (42) or p1(·, ·) (43), according to
the current value of the attack probability. Finally, Fig. 5 shows how the attack estimates extracted from
p(a) of the two components of the attack vector, coincide with the actual values inside the attack time
interval [150, 350]. Note that outside that interval the estimates of the attack vector are not meaningful
because the attack probability rk|k is almost 0.
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Fig. 3: True and estimated attack probability.
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Fig. 4: True and estimated state components x1 and x2.
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Fig. 5: True and estimated attack components a1 and a2.
B. IEEE 14-bus power network
State estimation is of paramount importance to ensure the reliable operation of energy delivery systems
since it provides estimates of the power grid state by processing meter measurements and exploiting power
system models. Cyber attacks on power systems can alter available information at the control center and
generate fake meter and input data, potentially causing power outage and forcing the energy management
system to make erroneous decisions, e.g. on contingency analysis and economic dispatch. The proposed
GM-HBF was tested on the IEEE 14-bus system (Fig. 6) consisting of 5 synchronous generators and 11
load buses, with parameters taken from MATPOWER [33]. The dynamics of the system can be described
by the linearized swing equation [34] derived through the Kron reduction [35] of the linear small-signal
power network model. The DC state estimation model assumes 1 p.u. (per unit) voltage magnitudes in all
buses and j1 p.u. branch impedance, with j denoting imaginary unit. The system dynamics is represented
by the evolution of n = 10 states comprising both the rotor angles δj and the frequencies ωj of each
generator j in the network. After discretization (with sampling interval T = 0.01s), the model of the
system takes the form (1)-(2), where the whole state is measured by a network Si of sensors. The system
is assumed to be corrupted by additive zero mean Gaussian white process and measurement noises with
variances σ2w = 0.01 and σ
2
v = 0.01. At time k = 50 a signal attack vector a = [0.2, 0.1]
T p.u. is injected
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Fig. 6: Single-line model of the IEEE 14-bus system. The true victim load buses 3 and 9 are circled in red.
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Fig. 7: Number of extra fake measurements injected (blue circles) and undelivered (pd = 0.95) system-originated
observations (red cross in −1) vs time. The proposed GM-HB filter turns out to be particularly robust to extra
packet injection attacks.
into the system to abruptly increase the real power demand of the two victim load buses 3 and 9 with an
additional loading of 21.23% and, respectively, 33.9%. This type of attack, referred to as load altering
attack [36], can provoke a loss of synchrony of the rotor angles and hence a deviation of the rotor speeds
of all generators from their nominal value. In addition, we fixed the following parameters: pb = 0.05,
ps = 0.95, pd = 0.95, pruning and merging thresholds γp = 10−2 and γm = 3 for the Gaussian-mixture
implementation. Let us first consider the system under extra packet injection attack. The additional fake
measurements injected into the sensor channels are modeled as uniformly distributed over the interval
[−10, 5], suitably chosen to emulate system-originated observations. Fake and missed packets are shown
in Fig. 7 for a specific run. The joint attack detection and state estimation performance of the GM-HBF
algorithm has been analyzed by Monte Carlo simulations. Fig. 8 shows the true and estimated probability
of attack existence (a) and the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), averaged over 1000 Monte Carlo runs,
relative to the rotor angle (b) and frequency (c) estimates. Fig. 8 (d) shows the RMSE of the estimated
components of the signal attack, extracted from p1k|k(a, x). As shown in the results (a)-(d), the proposed
secure state estimator succeeds in promptly detecting a signal attack altering the nominal energy delivery
system behavior, and hence in being simultaneously resilient to integrity attacks on power demand, and
robust to extra fake packets and undelivered measurements. Fig. 9 provides, for a single Monte Carlo
trial, a comparison between the true and the estimated values of the two rotor angles mainly affected
by the victim load buses, and clearly shows how δ1 and δ3 lose synchrony once the load altering attack
24
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time step
0
0.5
1
(a)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time step
0
0.5
1 (c)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time step
0
0.5
1 (d)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time step
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
(b)
Fig. 8: Performance of the GM-HBF in terms of joint attack detection (a) and estimation of attack signal (b), rotor
angles δi, i = 1, . . . , 5 (c), and frequencies ωi, i = 1, . . . , 5 (d).
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Fig. 9: Estimated vs true trajectory of rotor angles δj , j = 1, 3. Note that, if |δj | is sufficiently large (values close
to pi/2), the linear small signal approximation significantly deviates from the nonlinear dynamics of the system,
and hence the assumed dynamic model becomes inaccurate.
enters into action. Nevertheless, the proposed secure filter keeps tracking the state evolution with high
accuracy even after time k = 50, once recognized that the system is under attack.
Finally, Fig. 10 shows the performance of the GM-HBF in estimating the generator frequencies ω1
and ω3, before and after the appearance of the signal attack on the victim loads. The performance of the
proposed GM-HBF under packet substitution attack, i.e. the filter adopting the correction step described
in part 1) of Section III-A, is shown in Fig. 11 for pf = 0.3 and pd = 1. It is worth noting that the
probability of packet substitution pf can be seen as a design parameter which can be suitably tuned so as
to enhance estimation performance. This is illustrated in Fig. 12 where the mean (over time, components
and Monte Carlo runs) RMSE on state/attack estimation is shown as a function of parameter pf . By
contrast, simulation results indicated that the choice on pf does not significantly affect the overall attack
detection performance.
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Fig. 10: Estimated vs true trajectory of frequencies ω1 and ω3.
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Fig. 11: Performance of the GM-HBF under packet substitution attack (pf = 0.3) in terms of (a) attack detection,
(b) attack reconstruction, and (c)-(d) state estimation.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed a general framework to solve resilient state estimation for (linear/nonlinear) cyber-
physical systems considering switching signal attacks, fake measurement injection and packet substitution.
Random finite sets have been exploited in order to model the switching nature of the signal attack as
well as the possible presence of fake measurements, and a Bayesian random set estimation problem has
been formulated for jointly detecting a signal attack and estimating the system state. In this way, a hybrid
Bernoulli filter for the Bayes-optimal solution of the posed problem has been derived and implemented as
a Gaussian-sum filter. Numerical examples concerning both a benchmark system with direct feedthrough
and a realistic energy delivery system have been presented so as to demonstrate the potentials and the
real-world applicability of the proposed approach. Future work will concern worst-case performance
degradation analysis for the developed filter and its application to resilient state estimation in distributed
settings with non-secure communication links.
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Fig. 12: Mean RMSE on state (generators’ rotor angles and frequencies) and attack estimation under packet
substitution attack as a function of filter’s parameter pf . Simulated packet substitutions occur with probability
p¯f = 0.1. The choice of pf can improve estimation performance (the best results are obtained when pf = p¯f ) which,
however, turns out to be comparable for most parameter’s values in the set {10−5, 10−4, 10−3, 10−2, 0.1, 0.5, 0.9}.
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